The girl's parents brought a federal court suit against the school officials. The suit alleged that the actions and inactions of the school authorities with respect to the peer-on-peer sexual harassment constituted gender discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause and also violated Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972. The constitutional claim was brought under the federal civil rights act of 1871 (the Ku Klux Klan Act), 42 U.S. C. sec. 1983, which imposes liability against any person who, acting under color of state law, violates rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Title IX provides that, "[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," and authorizes claims against school districts receiving federal funds.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (which covers Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico) held that by the enactment of Title IX, Congress intended to preclude the use of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to present claims of unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. (The Court also held that the actions of the school authorities in dealing with the matter were not violative of Title IX, and that part of its decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court). The result of this decision is that when there is a claim of unconstitutional gender discrimination in the schools, the claim must be asserted against the school district in accordance with the provisions of Title IX instead of as a constitutional claim against the school district and against school officials under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983.

The question is one of Congressional intent. When Congress enacted Title IX, did it thereby intend to preclude the use of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 to present claims of unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools? It may be noted that Title IX did not expressly bar the use of section 1983 to present such claims. Rather the Court held that Title IX's remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive as to demonstrate Congress's intent to limit the available remedies to those provided by Title IX itself. The parents contend that Title IX's remedial scheme is not sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate such intent, primarily because the primary means of enforcing the statute is the withholding of federal funds, which is rarely used. They also argue that Title IX does not provide a remedy against school officials and so will not deter them from engaging in unconstitutional discrimination.
Since the case involves a question of statutory interpretation, Congress can revisit the matter and make its intention clear - either way - after the Court decides the case.