Reform and Zionism
June 10, 2008
Israel | The Future
(12 comments)
By William Berkson As I was walking back from the 60th anniversary celebration on the National Mall last Sunday, I was thinking about what I had learned in the past year about the histories of Israeli and American Judaism.
Reform Judaism as a movement was originally opposed to Zionism, and only became Zionist after the rise of Hitler. I had been long aware of this, puzzling at it as an odd fact of history. But over the past year I became aware that there were fundamental issues involved. And it seems that the switch to Zionism took place without really addressing them. And the unresolved issues still are important for the relationship of Reform Judaism--indeed American Judaism as a whole--and Israel.
The two stories behind American and Israeli Judaism are in fact two nearly opposite responses to modern historical events.
The starting point was the same for both. In the middle ages, Jews were regarded both by themselves and others as a nation in exile, living in largely self-governing communities in foreign lands by sufferance of the local monarch. And Judaism was at once a religion, an ethnicity and a nationality. This situation changed radically during the European Enlightenment, as West European nations and America started to accept Jews as full and equal citizens of their states--at least in theory. Furthermore the economic position of the mass of Jews in these countries improved.
The leading response of German Jewry to this situation was that Jews should renounce aspirations to nationhood, and minimize appearance of ethnic separateness. Judaism should be a religion only, and that way full citizenship in the nation-states of Europe and would be made compatible with Judaism. This ideal of Judaism as only "ethical monotheism" was one cornerstone of the original Reform movement.
In Eastern Europe the situation was radically different, as the Enlightenment was never put into practice. Instead, Jews were suffering from increasing poverty and cruelly oppressive governments. The Rabbis in Eastern Europe, following the quietism of medieval Judaism, had nothing to offer to help their people except prayer, study, and mystical escape. Furious with the impotence of the Rabbis to address the desperate needs of the people, many Eastern European Jews angrily rejected Jewish religion as a useless appendage, and turned to political firebrands who were preaching radical social change through socialism.
In this atmosphere, secular Zionism was born. The feeling was: let us embrace our Jewish heritage as an ethnicity and nationality, but reject both our impotent religion and our oppressive exile. Let us create our own secular socialist state for a new future as an ethnic group and a nation, and create it in our ancient geographic home.
A lot has changed since these ideologies were created over a century ago, and very few people today are still motivated by them in their original form. But neither in the US--which became the center of Reform Judaism--nor in Israel have the underlying philosophies been fully rethought and reconciled. The result is that the attitude of American and Israeli Jews toward Judaism are poles apart. For Americans, the decision to identify with Judaism is largely a decision about whether and how to be religious. For Israelis, Jews are Jewish by virtue of Jewish descent, living in Israel and speaking Hebrew. Their attitude toward religion is secondary, and is either 'hiloni', the dominant secular view, suspicious of religion, or 'dati', religious--meaning the Orthodox, who were a minority of Jewish immigrants of the last century. The Liberal Judaism originating in Germany--Reform and Conservative--has not been on the mental map of Israelis, though the American movements are now working hard to put it there.
How can this gap be bridged? A very interesting light on this question is shed by the book Liberal Nationalism for Israel: Towards an Israeli National Identity by Joseph Agassi--an Israeli philosopher who spent much of his career teaching at universities in both the US and Israel (and a former teacher of mine).
Agassi points out that nationalism as an ideology was in its origins largely reactionary, a reaction against the universalist ideals of the enlightenment, and an effort to create and support a unified nation of German speaking peoples. These reactionary origins have stigmatized nationalism in the eyes of liberals, and that stigma has been an excuse for anti-Zionist sentiment in left-wing politics.
Agassi argues against this bias that a liberal nationalism is viable, and hence a liberal Zionism. Cultures are real, and can be an engine of creative and progressive development. Hence the desire of a culture to a state in which it can thrive is not in itself objectionable, and can be very positive. However, that state needs to be a liberal state. That is, it must allow minority cultures an equal chance to thrive.
And here is where Agassi faults present the structure of the present day state of Israel. In his view the current state of Israel fails to be liberal enough because it does not separate religion and state. Instead of establishing a new constitution separating religion and state, Israel at its founding adopted the prevailing system left over from the Ottoman Empire, with different religions getting tax support and having some legal jurisdiction over their own separate communities.
For Agassi, this lack of a liberal constitution was a founding "original sin" of the state of Israel, and still is at the root of many of its problems. For example, in Agassi's view the key to resolving the Arab-Israel conflict is the full recognition and equal treatment of Israel's own Arab citizens. And in his view this can only be accomplished in a state that separates religion and state in the manner of the Constitution of the United States.
Agassi's analysis is focused on Israel, but I think it has very interesting implications for the relationship between Judaism in the Diaspora and in Israel. To me it suggests that to fully develop in a more internationally united way, Judaism in Israel needs to be on the same footing that it is in the US. Thus the separation of religion and state in Israel would be an important step to the positive development of Jewish culture worldwide.
That changed status of religion in Israel would of course only be one step toward a more productive interaction between Israeli and Diaspora Judaism. I'll consider some other step in another post.
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Dr. Berkson's excellent post tells us that Reform Judaism as a movement was originally opposed to Zionism, and only became Zionist after the rise of Hitler.
"Began to become Zionist" would probably be a better formulation -- recognizing the milestones of the acceptance in the 1937 Columbus platform of Palestine as a place of refuge; the collapse of anti-Zionism in 1948 in the wake of the reality of the state; the creation 30 years ago of ARZA as a formal Zionist voice for the movement; and the full integration of Zionism as a component of Reform Judaism as expressed in the Miami platform.
We should note that the coming together of Reform and Zionism required both movements to veer away from a basic principle in their earlier philosophies. Reform had to give up on the idea that Judaism was strictly a religion; Zionism had to give up on the idea of the eradication of the Diaspora.
Dr. Berkson has promised us further posts on this topic. I hope these will cover the two topics that the current post raises:
1. The need for separation of religion and state in Israel
2. The development of common ground between the Israeli and North American Reform/Progressive communities.