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    BOOKS & MUSIC

    Inside Intermarriage
    Inside Intermarriage:
    A Christian Partner's Perspective on Raising a Jewish Family

    by Jim Keen
    (URJ Press)

    The Torah
    The Torah: A Women's Commentary
    (URJ Press)

    Union for Reform Judaism

    Strengthening Reform 15: The Great Mitzvah Muddle
    September 26, 2008
    Defining Reform | Jewish Living | The Future (6 comments)

    by William Berkson
    The latest expression of the principles of Reform Judaism is the six-page "Pittsburgh Principles" of 1999. The book A Vision of Holiness: The Future of Reform Judaism, by Rabbi Richard Levy, begins with this statement, and expands on it to explain it more fully.

    One of the questions that was put to focus groups concerned autonomy and mitzvot: "... It is a given that Jews have the autonomous right to choose what beliefs and practices will inform their lives, but for Reform Jews the hard question is the role of Torah and mitzvot in their lives."

    The answer in the 1999 "Pittsburgh Principles" is as follows: "We are committed to the ongoing study of the whole array of mitzvot and to the fulfillment of those that address us as individual and as a community. Some of those mitzvot, sacred obligations, have long been observed by Reform Jews; others, both ancient and modern, demand renewed attention as the result of the unique context of our times."

    This is not a principle, but a 'punt'. If those practices are sacred obligations, then not following them was a mistake that we should correct. If they are not sacred obligations, ok, we don't have to follow them. Is this "principle" saying we should revive some old customs? If so, on what basis? No answers. Compared to the bracing clarity and forcefulness of the original Pittsburgh Platform, this is a fog.

    Rabbi Levy writes that the arguments over the status of tefilin, tallit, etc., were the most heated in discussions of what to put in the 1999 "Principles." This muddy paragraph I think reveals that in fact no clear conclusion was reached. Rabbi Levy in his book does take a dramatic step to clarify the issue of which mitzvot to observe: he clearly and forcefully rejects the long-standing Reform view that ethical and ritual mitzvot have a different status.

    Before addressing Rabbi Levy's solution, let me take a step back and see what has led up to Rabbi Levy's dramatic change. The 1885 Pittsburgh Platform says that while Reform Jews accept traditional moral laws as binding, they maintain only "such ceremonies as elevate and sanctify our lives, but reject all such as are not adapted to the views and habits of modern civilization." The 1937 "Columbus Platform," reaffirms this view, though in less clear terms: "Being the products of historical processes, certain of its laws have lost their binding force with the passing of the conditions that called them forth. ... Each age has the obligation to adapt the teachings of the Torah to its basic needs ..." Note that in this language implicitly some rituals are viewed as obligatory, a change from 1885.

    The 1976 "Reform Judaism: Centenary Perspective" represents a more significant shift. First, it clearly labels specific rituals as obligatory: "The past century has taught us that the claims made upon us may begin with our ethical obligations but they extend to many other aspects of Jewish living: [a Jewish home, life-long study, public prayer, daily private prayer, keeping Shabbat and holidays, involvement in synagogue and community, promoting survival of Jewish people.]" But it goes on to qualify or contradict this obligation on all Reform Jews with a concluding message: "Reform Jews ... are called on to exercise their individual autonomy, choosing and creating [religious practice] on the basis of knowledge and commitment." How to reconcile the two messages is not entirely clear, but it seems that individual Reform Jews can contradict the general recommendations on ritual, but only if they do so on a basis of being well informed and still committed as Jews.

    We went from an 1885 "Platform" to a 1976 "Perspective," and the changes in title I think indicate an increased tentativeness and nervousness about the direction of Reform. The "Perspective" tries to wrestle with increased diversity of practice within Reform by making a virtue of it: "Reform Jews respond to change in various ways according to the Reform principle of autonomy of the individual. However, Reform Judaism does more than tolerate diversity; it engenders it. In our uncertain historical situation we must expect to have far greater diversity than previous generations knew."

    This emphasis on "autonomy" it seems is a post-war idea, and perhaps an influence of the extreme individualism that swept the US in the 1960's, and the resulting diversity. "Diversity within unity" is a brave motto of the "Perspective", but as the conflict between forceful direction on ritual and then big qualification shows, the writers of the "Perspective" were not at all clear how that unity could be maintained.

    The 1999 Duties of the Soul: The Role of Commandments in Judaism is a thoughtful volume in which many Reform Rabbis try to resolve the mixed messages of obligation and autonomy that were contained in the 1976 "Perspective." However, I think it fair to say that no clear resolution of the issue emerges from the volume.

    Now Rabbi Levy has come in his 2005 Vision of Holiness with his dramatic proposal to cut the 'Gordian Knot' of the mitzvah muddle by declaring no distinction between the ethical and ritual mitzvot. While Rabbi Levy's Vision contains much that is beautiful and touching, I think that abolishing the distinction between ritual and ethical mitzvot is a spectacularly bad idea for Reform Judaism. In my next post I will explain why.

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    Comments

    Larry Kaufman said:

    The clarity of Pittsburgh 1885, which guided the movement for half a century, related to things that Reform Jews shouldn't do -- and these were essentially things they didn't want to do.

    This had morphed by a hundred years later into an attitude that was essentially, you don't have to do them, but if you want to it's ok. And that took place because some of these were things that Jews who were migrating from other streams wanted to do, but within the context of Reform Judaism.

    The schism that made Pittsburgh 1999 nisht milchig nisht fleishig (neither dairy nor meat) was the fending off of any suggestion that would go from may to should, which could lead to the slippery slope of going from should to must.

    The issue of autonomy is not the distinction between ethical and ritual. Autonomy is the recognition that neither your rabbi, nor any assembly of rabbis, nor any organization of congregations, has any real sanctions to put forth if some one turns a must into a No Way.

    I would be glad to see the movement develop a more stringent roster of Shoulds, accompanied by something that would encourage the Jews in the pews to respond Naaseh v'nishma -- we'll do it and we'll hearken to it. But still the congregational rabbi would have the autonomy to endorse it to the congregation -- or not. Enforce it? Can't happen.

    David A.M. Wilensky said:

    I am in 100% agreement with your final conclusion here, William.

    If there is a difference between mitzvot bein adam l'chaveiro and mitzvot bein adam laMakom, fine. In that case, we know that one type is obligatory, while one is not. The one that is not obligatory becomes a personally or communally autonomous series of decisions to be made or experimented with.

    If, however, as Rabbi Levy would now have it, there is no difference, we are left in one of two dangerous positions. If all now fall under a category of obligatory and binding, we're Orthodox or Conservative at best, and Reform comes to and end. If, on the other hand, none of the commandments are now seen as obligatory, we are left in an even more dangerous position. Not only do we stand on the ritually shaky ground we already stand on, but if this is the case, we would stand on morally, ethically shaky grounds. We would have no way to ascertain what is acceptable behavior.

    William Berkson said:

    Larry, interesting point that this is partly a reaction to the influx of formerly Conservative Jews into Reform. I think it is also just that a lot of rabbis like the traditional rituals. Rabbis are in general in the ritual business, and naturally tend to like them more than the average congregant.

    If 'autonomy' where just a recognition of the reality that you can't impose ritual choices on individuals, that would be fine. But there is this other thing going on in the Reform literature, which is to wrongly sees some philosophical point that prevents you from giving direction to people.

    And to me it's a bit of an excuse, because when the movement wants to draw lines, it does. For example, as was pointed out here, it doesn't take congregations which declare they don't believe in God and are "Humanist". And they I'm sure they won't accept "messianic" Jewish congregations. Also there is in parallel with this appeal to 'autonomy' a tradition of responsa deciding ritual issues, quite undeterred by the fact that individuals and congregations will make the ultimate decisions on what to practice. So the situation is conflicted and confused, or so it seems to me looking into this recent history.

    David, the issue you raise also occurred to me. I was taken aback that the book doesn't address it.

    More soon.

    BZ said:

    As I have argued, the problem with the 1999 Pittsburgh Principles as well as with the discourse surrounding it (on all sides) is that it adopts an understanding of mitzvot that is external to Reform Judaism. It postulates the existence of an objectively agreed-upon "whole array of mitzvot" in reference to which we should define our practice (whether we accept it or reject it or some combination). Thus autonomy is reduced to a set of yes/no questions to which each individual is free to answer yes or no, but there is no possibility of reframing the questions, and no possibility for the mitzvot themselves to evolve.

    The 1976 Centenary Perspective does not suffer from this problem, nor do I think it is contradictory in the way you suggest. The areas mentioned as "obligations" are extremely general. Keeping Shabbat is not a "specific ritual"; there are at least as many specific ways of keeping Shabbat as there are Jews. Daily private prayer is not mentioned; it says "daily religious observance", which can be interpreted in many different ways (including the daily observance of ethical mitzvot). Within these very general areas, the specifics are left up to individual autonomy, which should be exercised within a context of knowledge of our shared texts and history.

    For example, we all share the same Torah, which contains the verse "Bind them as a sign upon your hand, and let them be a symbol before your eyes." Some might understand this as referring to placing physical boxes on one's arm and forehead, and put on tefillin. Others might also understand the verse this way, and see tefillin as an artifact of a bygone era with no relevance to us in the present time. Others might understand it figuratively, meaning that the imperative to love God should inform all of our actions and the way we see the world. Others might have yet another interpretation that no one has thought of yet.

    And ethical mitzvot are not exempt from autonomy. For example, the Torah contains the commandment to leave the corners of our fields for those in need, and we might come up with different interpretations of how those of us who are not farmers can apply this in the present time. As I have argued, the thing preventing us from scrapping ethical mitzvot entirely, or interpreting them out of existence, isn't procedural (halachic) but is aggadic. Our halachic choices must be informed by our aggadah, and Reform aggadah has always emphasized the importance of ethics.

    BZ said:

    William Berkson writes:
    But there is this other thing going on in the Reform literature, which is to wrongly sees some philosophical point that prevents you from giving direction to people.

    But who's "you", and who's "people"? Though the implementation of this principle in the Reform movement has largely been nonexistent (or worse), I think there is something to be said for a philosophical principle that there is fundamentally no such distinction (unlike, e.g., in the Conservative movement, where the rabbi of the community is at least theoretically the "mara d'atra", with decision-making authority on behalf of the congregants.). To the extent that we are obligated, it's not because our rabbi or institution told us that we are. Rather, the sense of obligation should come first, and the creation of institutions, hiring of rabbis, etc., should be an outgrowth of this. Ironically, this is implemented better in the Orthodox world than in the Reform movement.

    Also there is in parallel with this appeal to 'autonomy' a tradition of responsa deciding ritual issues, quite undeterred by the fact that individuals and congregations will make the ultimate decisions on what to practice. So the situation is conflicted and confused, or so it seems to me looking into this recent history.

    I know several non-Reform Jews who use CCAR responsa as research tools when they want to study a particular halachic topic. Even if these people don't agree with the CCAR's conclusions, the responsa summarize the sources, with citations to the texts, and can be a useful jumping-off point for the individual who wants to study further. So I think CCAR responsa can fulfill this function for Reform Jews as well; the conclusions are secondary, but the important thing is that they lay out the different positions and the justifications for each, so that individuals/congregations don't have to reinvent the wheel when they engage in the necessary study to make informed autonomous decisions.

    William Berkson said:

    BZ, I like very much your analysis in the first paragraph of your first response. I agree, the huge problem is that there is no dynamism to the concept: you either accept an old tradition, or not. I will explain how to break out of this box in my next post.

    "Daily religious observance" is in a list of "other aspects of Jewish living" than "ethical obligation," so I don't think it will fly to interpret the phrase as including ethical action. I do think the seeds of the confusion in the 1999 Principles are already in the 1976 Perspective. But anyway we agree on where we are now, I think.

    Your question about 'you' and 'people': by 'you' I mean decisions of the movement as a movement. Such decisions are being made by the Responsa committees--which I would like to see a wider process. I agree with you that individual rabbis, congregations, and individuals will make their own decisions in reading the arguments. But honestly, that's what has happened with the Talmud anyway. The point of having minority opinions was to allow for a continuing process of refinement and even revision of past decisions.

    I don't think that decisions about ethical and religious guidelines should be an either-or matter--either a central decision or an individual one. I think there should be a centrally guided broad discussion process and then central decisions on recommendations or guidelines. Then congregations and individuals can decide on the bases of those movement-wide guidelines and their own personal views.

    If that outlook is "autonomy," that's fine by me. If you say that "autonomy" prevents any central recommendation on eg. whether to pray with tifilin if you are a reform Jew, then I don't buy it--I think it's just an excuse for not touching an issue you don't want to touch.

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